August 12th, 2025
On August 11, 2025, a China Coast Guard cutter identified as CCG 3104 collided with a Chinese navy warship while both were chasing a Philippine Coast Guard vessel near Scarborough Shoal. The Philippines was delivering supplies to local fishermen when the chase occurred. The collision disabled the Chinese cutter, forcing it to request assistance. The Philippines extended offers of medical aid and towing, even as the incident underscored the dangers that Philippine forces face in defending sovereign rights in contested waters. In such moments, the strength of our alliances is measured not in lofty declarations but in precise, credible, and timely commitments.
That commitment had already been secured weeks earlier. On July 21, 2025, during President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s state visit to Washington, United States Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth met with the President at the Pentagon and made the clearest articulation yet of treaty coverage under the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty. He stated that the pact “extends to armed attacks on our armed forces, aircraft or public vessels, including our Coast Guard, anywhere in the Pacific, including the South China Sea.” This was not a generic statement of friendship unlike those we used to get under the Obama and Biden administrations. It was a legal and strategic guarantee, pre-positioned before any crisis, that explicitly named the waters where our sovereignty is most contested.
In my years of public service, I have seen the Mutual Defense Treaty invoked after incidents had already occurred, as in the June 17, 2024 Second Thomas Shoal incident where Chinese actions injured Filipino personnel and seized equipment. Then, allied statements came with a note of caution and a lag in time. This time, the pledge was in place before a flashpoint occurred, ensuring that when the August 11 collision took place, there was no ambiguity about the U.S. position or the scope of its obligations.
That clarity was backed by visible action. On August 12, Chinese state media reported that a United States Navy destroyer had been deployed near Scarborough Shoal. Philippine military officials later confirmed the presence of the vessel in the area, coinciding with heightened tensions and making the U.S. position visible in the very waters Hegseth had explicitly placed under treaty coverage. The strategic message was unmistakable: the commitment made on July 21 was not only a matter of words but was paired with the movement of high-value military assets into the contested zone.
The explicit inclusion of the South China Sea in Hegseth’s July 21 statement is strategically significant. By naming Scarborough Shoal and other contested areas through that geographic reference, the United States removed a grey zone of interpretation. The message to any aggressor was clear: actions against Philippine forces or vessels in those waters would be covered, and would elicit a response consistent with the treaty.
This is one of the most responsive and forward-looking applications of the Mutual Defense Treaty since its signing on August 30, 1951. It marks the end of the period when responses to incidents were couched mainly in the language of shared values. It signals the start of concrete and enforceable action, with clear treaty language matched by operational presence, reinforced by strengthened joint exercises and a more robust regional posture.
It is also among the most tangible benefits that President Marcos Jr. secured from his state visit to the United States. Few moments in the history of the treaty have tied commitment so directly to the most likely site of confrontation, and positioned that commitment before the test arrived.